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ABSTRACT This paper discusses several issues in relation to 1996 Presidential and
Parliamentary elections in Zambia. First, the extent to which the Lozi commonality still
accorded loyalty to their traditional authority (the Litunga) and the question of whether or not
they were going to be influenced to vote according to his will. Second, the issue of the rela-
tions that existed between the Lozi Royal Establishment and the Movement for Multi-party
Democracy (MMD) Government, and its related subject? ‘The Barotseland Agreement.’
Third, the issues of the people’s perceptions of the elections, with reference to their being
free and fair, the people’s political party/party leader preferences, the people’s rating of the
ruling party’s performance in terms of development and the upholding of human rights, etc.
Last but not the least, the paper deals with the manner in which the election campaigns were
conducted as well as the results of both the Presidential and the Parliamentary polls them-
selves.
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INTRODUCTION
This study is focused on the Lozi(1) people of Zambia’s Western Province (for-
merly Bulozi or Barotseland).(2) They comprise various ethnic groups who have
lived together under the Luyi Kings long before the coming of Europeans. Their
state was among the most notable of the kingdoms found in the Southern, Central
and Eastern Regions of Africa by the European colonizers. And it was through their
then reigning king, Lubosi Lewanika that the British South African Company
(B.S.A.Co.) gained a foothold in what came to be called Northern Rhodesia .
I. Purpose of the Study
The study was designed to examine the following factors:
(a) the strength of the attachment that the Lozi people still have towards their tra-
ditional authority–the Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE).
(b) the Royal Establishment’s attitude towards the government and the existing
political parties; and the possible impact of such an attitude upon the 1996
elections.
(c) the people’s perceptions of the 1996 elections vis-a-vis
(i) their being free and fair
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(ii) their envisaged outcomes.
(d) the people’s party/party leader preferences in relation to the elections.
(e) the people’s feelings regarding the government’s performance in the uphold-
ing of ‘Human Rights’ and the development of the country generally and that
of the Western Province and its constituencies in particular.
(f) the political parties’ organizational structures, campaign strategies and choice
of candidates as means of capturing the electorate’s votes.
(g) the possible existence of polarization of voter preferences of candidates on
ethnic grounds and the extent of such polarization if at all it exists.
II. Methodology
The study employed both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection.
It used a questionnaire to obtain quantitative data on certain aspects of the study. It
also used interviews, group discussions, library research and print media as alterna-
tive sources of data.
The envisaged study area was the province’s six districts. This is because all of
them have peculiar features which call for special political investigations. Kaoma,
for instance, is multi-ethnic and has the Lozi-Nkoya conflict whose political signifi-
cance should be of interest to political scientists. Four districts were visited prior to
election time. These were Mongu the provincial capital, Senanga, Kaoma and
Kalabo. A fifth district (Lukulu) was also visited during the election period.
The questionnaire was administered on people who were picked randomly in vari-
ous government institutions, compounds, church premises and at chiefs’ palaces
mainly. But the people involved had to be literate and of voting age. Information
from none literate people was obtained through interviews and their participation in
group discussions.
III. Theoretical and General Issues
Every Traditional Establishment constitutes an interest group. Like any other
group of people, it has values and interests it cherishes and would like to perpetuate.
Every Traditional Establishment also has particular relations with the state. These
may be positive, if it views the state as being accommodative of its interests or neg-
ative, if it considers the state as being inimical to them. The type of relations nor-
mally determines whether the Traditional Establishment will be supportive of the
party in power during an election or not. And whatever the case, the Establishment
most invariably urges/directs its subjects to vote in a manner it considers most likely
to advance its cause. Such directives are not always adhered to, however, unless
they are in harmony, rather than at variance with those of the subjects themselves.
For although Traditional Establishments are linked to their peoples, the interests of
the two groups are not always identical. There sometimes exist differences of opin-
ion or choice between the two; when faced with opposing parties seeking election to
political office(s). This actually happened in the Barotseland protectorate in the early
1960s, when the Traditional Establishment’s favoured party, Barotse National Party
(BNP) was twice defeated by the United National Independence Paty (UNIP).
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This study evolves around three basic concepts: traditionalism, democracy and
political participation. Below is a brief explanation of each of them.
The first concept is traditionalism. This is defined by the Oxford Advanced
Learner’s Dictionary as ‘respect or support for tradition ....as contrasted with mod-
ern or new practices.’ And the Longman Dictionary of the English Language defines
it in two ways, first as ‘the doctrines or practices of those who follow or accept tra-
dition,’ and secondly as ‘the beliefs of those opposed to modernism, liberalism or
radicalism.’ Inferred from these definitions is that the word refers to a state of hav-
ing a liking for or positive values towards a people’s established norms of behaviour
(etiquette) or ways of doing things. Inferred from them too is that the term embraces
tenets of conservatism. It is in these senses that I have used the term. For it was my
desire to find out how far Lozis still adhere to their traditional ways of life and how
such adherence might affect the electoral process in their area.
The second concept we need to explain is democracy. Besides Abraham
Linchon’s popular definition of the term as ‘government of the people by the people
and for the people,’ the word has other definitions and diverse notions as well. Some
think of it in terms of a government comprising a large number of representatives
coming from the entire country, while others say that it is ‘a government of the state
by many, as opposed to a government of a few, or one’ (Austin, J., 1886: 59 quoted
in Maine, 1918). The large array of definitions, notwithstanding, however, it is obvi-
ous that most, if not all of them, have inadequacies of some sort. For this reason, it
has been decided not to wrestle with the issue of the definition of this word here, but
to explain it in terms of the various activities that either characterize it or are repug-
nant to it. The government’s upholding of human rights is a democratic feature for
instance, and so is its respect for people’s liberties and individual freedoms. Other
manifestations of democracy include the avoidance of bribery and corruption during
elections and the over utilization of force or other under-hand methods when seek-
ing votes or political office.
The study examined the existence/maintenance of these rights in the province, or
their denial to the people by the government, in order to assess the impact of such
maintenance/denial on the people’s political participation process.
The third key concept is political participation. This has been used to refer to peo-
ple’s involvement in the political process through such avenues as political affilia-
tion, holding/attending political meetings, standing for political office, political
canvassing, and voting in elections. The study examined the people’s political par-
ticipation in relation to these criteria to see whether the prevailing political system in
the country facilitates democracy by allowing people a large measure of political
participation or otherwise.
IV. Organization of the Study
Organizationally, the study falls under eight sections. The first is this introduction;
which deals with the area of study, its purpose, methodology, theoretical and general
issues and the organization of material. The second bears the ‘Historical
Background’. The third is on ‘the Lozi People and Electoral Politics’, and deals with
Lozi-MMD government relations, as well as the study findings vis-a-vis the Lozi
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people’s strong support for traditional authority, their commitment to freedom of
choice, as well as the Royal Establishment’s neutral policy towards the elections in
the later part of the election campaign period. The fourth focuses on ‘the
MMD/UNIP Contest for Support: Electoral Politics before the UNIP Boycott’,
which covers such issues as the unpredictability of election results in the early stage
of the study, the MMD government’s performance ratings, fears regarding the free-
dom and fairness of the elections, and the rise in UNIP’s election ratings. The fifth
deals with: ‘the UNIP Withdrawal and the MMD/ZADECO Dominance of the
Election Campaigns’. It discusses the success or failure of the boycott and the
resulting dominance of the campaigns by the two stated political parties. The sixth is
about ‘Undemocratic Tendencies in the Electoral Process’, which include such
things as bribery, the imposition of candidates, block voting, the use of government
vehicles for campaign purposes, etc. The seventh is on the election results (both par-
liamentary and presidential) and it is followed by the conclusion.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The history of Western Province, from the founding of the Lozi state in the 17th
century, to the end of the ‘One Party Era’ in 1991, can neatly be divided in three
phases: the pre-colonial phase, the colonial phase and the UNIP Rule phase which
embraces the ‘Barotseland Agreement’ issue.
I. The Pre-Colonial Phase
This began with the founding of the state by Mboo Muyunda, soon after the Luyi
arrival in the Barotse Central Plain under the leadership of his mother,
Mbuywamwambwa. Once established, the state grew in size and importance under
eminent rulers and a highly centralized polditical structure. The rulers did not only
greatly extend the kingdom’s boundaries and sphere of influence, but they managed
to keep it intact throughout the pre-colonial period except the short period of Kololo
conquest and rule from mid 1840s to 1864. The expansion and consolidation of the
state was accompanied by an evolution of a complex socio-economic political order
which fascinated Europeans when they came to the area. This consisted of such
things as ‘dual kingship’, ‘dual administrative structure,’ and ‘autochthonous demo-
cratic ideals and practices’.
Dual kingship began at the time of Ngombala in the 18th century. It came about
when the king gave the southern part of the kingdom to his daughter Notulu to
administer – albeit on a subordinate basis. Whereas the arrangement later led to
occasional power struggles between the senior kingship (Namuso) and the junior
one (Lwambi),(3) it helped ease the process of administration in the country by divid-
ing it. This was the more so when other subordinate chieftaincies were subsequently
set up at Libonda, Kaunga-Mashi, Sesheke, Kaoma, and Lukulu.
The dual administrative structure consisted of the territorial division of the king-
dom in chiefdoms and ‘lilalo’,(4) for judicial and general administrative purposes;
and that of its people in ‘makolo’ labour and military divisions. The ‘makolo’ divi-
108 ?????????
????????????????????????? ?????
sions were not locally based but had their members in all areas of the kingdom. This
meant that people of the same area or even village could belong to different
‘makolo’ and would work or fight in different units because of this.
The territorial division was of enormous advantage to the judicial process. This is
in so far as it provided for and facilitated the appeal system. Anyone who felt
wronged by another but could not obtain justice from a village or ‘silalo’ based
‘Kuta’ (court), had a chance to appeal to higher ones at the subordinate/senior
chief’s capital if he/she wished.
The ‘makolo’ ones were equally valuable. They minimized the chances of local
insurrections. Since a ‘likolo’ had its members scattered across the country, it was
not easy for its general or any of its officers to organize, let alone effect a successful
rebellion against the king. This was because his plans could very easily be discov-
ered and thwarted. This is not to deny the occurrence of revolts against rulers during
the period altogether. For as already pointed out some certainly took place and even
led to the overthrow of the incumbent rulers. But such revolts were organised at the
centre, rather than at local or lower levels of the state structure; and were only possi-
ble when leaders of many of the ‘makolo’ divisions were not happy with the status
quo.
While the concept of democracy is generally considered to be new to Africa, most
of its tenets can be said to have existed in the Lozi political system. These include
the right to fair trial (as testified by the existence of the appeal system referred to
above); the right to land and other forms of property; freedoms of speech, choice
and religion, popular participation in government, etc.(5) (Gluckman, 1965)
Though land was regarded as belonging to the ‘Litunga’, as per the Lozi saying:
‘minya mupu na ngombe’ (lit. the owner of land and cattle), he merely held it sym-
bolically and in trust for his people. His subjects had rights to it in terms of cultiva-
tion, grazing, procuring clay for making pots, etc. They even had the right of
protection against trespass upon their holdings by the ‘Litunga’ himself (Gluckman,
1965: 37). Thus when a person went to the ‘litunga’ to ask for land, the latter nor-
mally sent him/her to the ‘owners of the land’ in the area he/she wished to settle,
with a request that they (the owners) offer him/her a portion. Since people had
respect for their rulers and their system, and probably owing to the plentifulness of
land supply at the time also, such requests were always granted. And people who
thus obtained land, were obliged to go and pay homage to the king for it through the
Kushowelela institution,(6) in addition to thanking the people from whom they actu-
ally got it.
This does not mean that the ‘Litunga’ had no land of his own or that which could
be used in his official capacity as ruler. He had an individual right to portions of his
ancestral lands (mubu wa sipepo) and many others that were tied to the kingship
institution. The latter included ‘masimu a mulena’ (the king’s fields), ‘mishitu ya
mulena’ (the king’s forests) and ‘masa a mulena’ (the king’s fish ponds). They were
all meant to serve him in various ways. Timber from his designated forests were
used for building his palaces, for instance, while fish from his ponds and grain from
his institutional fields provided food both for his family needs and those of his pri-
vate and state visitors. Such food was supplemented by proceeds from the tribute
institution, which basically was two dimensional in nature. One form of it (tribute
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labour) was responsible for exploiting the king’s land resources to obtain the said
food stuffs from them, while its other form (tribute in food and commodities)
brought in the said food supplementation and other property requirements.
The ultimate result of the two forms of tribute was the king’s self-sufficiency in
foodstuffs and various types of property. This was because they brought in vast
quantities of food and commodities, not only from his subjects but from conquered
peoples also. The conveyance of these things in great quantities led some outsiders
to regard the state as having been highly exploitative and oppressive, just as others
had also wrongly associated it with feudalism. All these notions were, however,
inapplicable. The state was not exploitative for two reasons.
The first is that the food and commodities a Lozi gave to his/her king comprised a
minute fraction of his/her produce. Very few Lozis failed to contribute something to
their king, and consequently to the state, since they were not required to give more
than they could afford to part with. However, because those involved were many, the
things that were given became substantial in the end. They were substantial because
they came from many people and not because too much was levied from particular
individuals.
Second, the amount of labour required of each Lozi man/woman for royal or state
duties was not too great to warrant or justify the use of the word oppression in
describing that state. Although people were required to help build mounds for kings’
capitals and/or burial places, or transport canals (maabwa) since the time of
Lewanika,(7) the amount of time spent by individuals on such projects was fairly
minimal, since work was done in turns, with each group of workers taking a rela-
tively short period of time.(8) Nor was the time required to cultivate the king’s fields
excessive. Since the size of such fields was scarcely ever enormous; and because
their cultivation involved ‘everyone’ living in the ‘silalo’ (administrative area)
where the fields were situated, work lasted a few days – leaving the people the rest
of the farming season to attend to their fields. These factors show the inappropriate-
ness of terming the Lozi state exploitative and oppressive.
The feudal tag is equally inappropriate to the Lozi state for three reasons: the
none existence of serfdom there, the none practice of individual tenure as was the
case in feudal Europe (Gluckman, 1995: 35-40) and the insignificance of labour spe-
cialization and the output of durable goods. It is also invalidated by the existence of
various rights and individual freedoms, which the state upheld. The existence of
such rights and freedoms is attested to in many ways at present. It is talked about
and explained by some elderly people, it is manifested in the people’s way of life
(e.g. when appointing someone to succeed to a position of authority) and it is
recorded in some scholarly works. A pertinent example of the latter is what Max
Gluckman wrote concerning the nature of the litungas’ rule. After pointing to the
existence of evidence to the effect that Lozi ‘litungas’ do not rule dictatorially he
said:
... they lead by Lozi law (mulao wa malozi), a whole body of rules defining rights and
duties and of procedures for seeking justice from the Litunga. Most of the law, its body
of rights (liswanelo) and justice (tukelo or niti?truth), has existed from time immemor-
ial. (Gluckman, 1965: 37)
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Besides upholding the democratic rights and freedoms of its citizens, the Lozi
state was also accommodative of other people and their cultures. A typical example
of such people are the Mbunda. These first came to Bulozi at the time of
Ngombala in the 18th century. This was when a man named Namulimbwa, Yauma
from Kutii in Angola visited Kaywa, the leader of the people of Imilangu at the
time. Because this man helped Ngombala destroy the Sitamemba/Kambunji chief-
taincy in Nyengo (Sumbwa, 1979: 109-111), the king rewarded him with a chief-
taincy in Imilangu and promised to welcome any of his tribesmen who might come
into his kingdom in due course. Consequently, when two large groups of Mbunda
arrived there in the 19th century, they were well received by King Mulambwa – who
also elevated their chiefs (Mwenes Kandala and Chiengele) to the level of Lozi
princes. Good welcome was equally shown to Mwene Mundu and his people upon
their arrival in the area in 1917.
This good welcome was not only accorded to them on arrival, but it was strongly
maintained. This helped to unite the two peoples, strengthen their state and enrich it
in many ways. They fought side by side during times of war, worked together on
public projects, shared their skills and talents, etc. And although the two could not
share certain features of life e.g. circumscion, this did not sour their relations,
because of the respect for other people’s culture that convention demanded. As a
result of this, the state continued to enjoy the harmony and stability that emanated
from the democratic practices that accompanied its evolution.
This harmony was disturbed by two incidents that occurred in quick succession
following the death of Mulambwa. These were a succession war involving two of
his sons (Silumelume and Mubukwanu), and the Kololo invasion.(9) Whereas some
revolts used to take place against some ‘litungas’ by their subordinates who ruled
the southern part of the kingdom, none of them caused worry and disruption among
the people to the extent that these two incidents did. The succession war disunited
the people and made them vulnerable to the invading forces, while the invasion
plunged the nation in about four years of warfare – which never happened before.(10)
Nor did the resulting conquest of the state by the invaders end the turmoil. For, it led
to a division of the people, with some remaining in the Flood Plain under the con-
querors’ subjugation and the majority emigrating to take refuge – some in Nyengo
(in the west) and others in Lukulu and Kabompo (in the north) of the kingdom.
This division perpetuated the animosities of the civil war to the extent that they
continued to cause instability in the land for about three decades after the overthrow
of the Kololo rule. This is evidenced by the dethronement of the first three rulers of
the restored Lozi state – even though the third (King Lewanika) was later restored to
his throne and grew to be a great and famous ruler.
II. The Colonial Phase
The beginning of this phase can be traced to the year 1890, when a treaty was
signed between King Lewanika and a British South African Company (B.S.A. Co.)
official named Frank Lochner. Promising British protection to the Lozi and mineral
and mining rights to the company, this treaty was followed by several others that
brought the state under British colonial administration. Contrary to the promises
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made, however, the setting up of colonial administration did not ensure protection
for the Lozi and their property. Rather, it resulted in the curtailment of some of their
king’s powers, expropriation of some of his people’s land,(11) the imposition of
unwarranted taxes,(12) exploitation of people’s labour and resources, arbitrary arrests,
imprisonments, etc. Among the king’s expropriated powers are those relating to the
adjudication of criminal cases and that of civil cases involving white men. They
were placed under various categories of British administrators.
Notwithstanding his loss of certain powers, however, Lewanika and his succes-
sors continued to wield and indeed exercise authority in other spheres of life, partic-
ularly those of a customary nature. Among them are those pertaining to local
government administration, land, forests, fishing, local taxation, the adjudication of
civil cases and the Barotse Native Treasury.(13) These powers were exercised through
institutions like the Barotse Native Courts, the Barotse Native Treasury and the
Barotse National Council, and involved the state’s bureaucrats (councillors and
indunas).
Besides retaining the above powers, Lozis also continued to enjoy nominal recog-
nition as a protected people, with their land being referred to as a ‘Protectorate,’
despite its being within another ‘protectorate’ (that of Northern Rhodesia) and its
British administrator as a ‘Resident Commissioner.’(14) This was in contrast with the
other divisions of the territory, which were called ‘Provinces’ and their administra-
tors as ‘Provincial Commissioners’.
The existence of this special status for Bulozi posed problems for the nationalists
who were fighting for the country’s independence. Initially, the problem was in rela-
tion to politicization in the ‘Protectorate’, and subsequently, with regard to the
preparation of the ‘Independence Constitution’. Owing to his distrust for the nation-
alists, the then reigning ‘litunga’, Mwanawina III, barred their parties, UNIP and
ANC, from operating in his domain (Mulford, 1967: 193-228). As a result of this a
number of UNIP activists who defied the ban prior to its lifting in June, 1962 found
themselves arrested and even imprisoned. They included the late Nalumino Mundia
(Caplan, 1970: 195-196), who later became the country’s Prime Minister. The prob-
lem relating to the ‘Independence Constitution’ was that negotiations over the mat-
ter could not be concluded until a separate agreement to cater for Bulozi’s special
position was negotiated and agreed upon. This forced the nationalists to negotiate
and come to an agreement with the ‘litunga’. The agreement was signed on 18th
May 1964 and it was called the ‘Barotseland Agreement.’ And its bearing document
was appended to the country’s ‘Independence Constitution’ of 1964.
III. The Post-Colonial Period and the Barotseland Agreement to October 1991
The post-colonial period in Zambia began with UNIP as the ruling party and Dr.
Kaunda as the new nation’s president. The government enjoyed immense support
among the people of Western Province at the time, as indeed it did with those of
other provinces accept southern. This was manifested (in the case of Western
Province) by UNIP’s trouncing of all other parties including the Royal
Establishment sponsored Barotse National Party (BNP) in three successive elections
that were fought in the 1962-1964 period.(15)
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Though enormous, this support for UNIP did not last long among the Lozi. The
reasons for this were Nalumino Mundia’s decision to leave the party and take up
leadership of the then newly formed United Party (UP),(16) the defeat of all but one of
the prominent Lozi politicians in the party’s Central Committee elections held at
Mulungushi (near Kabwe) in 1967(17) and the government’s prompt and systematic
abrogation of the ‘Barotseland Agreement’ of 1964.(18)
This ‘Agreement’ is undoubtedly among the most renowned issues associated
with the history of modern Zambia. It was signed by Kaunda, then Prime Minister
of Northern Rhodesia – on behalf of his government and  Mwanawina Lewanika III,
then Litunga of Barotseland – on behalf of himself and his subjects. Duncan Sandys,
then Principal Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and for the colonies,
also signed it (Appendix 2).
The nationalists intended it to ensure the inclusion of Barotseland in independent
Zambia, in view of the mistrust they had for the ‘Litunga’. The mistrust emanated
from secessionist tendencies of the Barotse Royal Establishment, and the clandes-
tine contacts it had with the nationalists’ foes at the time.(19) On his part, the
‘Litunga’ saw the Agreement as the last straw, in his efforts to safeguard his interests
and those of his people against UNIP, when it got complete autonomy for the coun-
try from Britain on Independence Day. This was because of the dismal failure of all
his secessionist endeavours previously.
The last of such attempts evolved around the BNP or ‘Sicaba Party’ as it was gen-
erally known in the province. Formation of this party was conceived in the Barotse
National Council meeting of April 1962. Apart from re-affirming the policy of
secession on the grounds that UNIP intended to destroy the ‘Litungaship’, depose
the indents and integrate Barotseland into Zambia, the Council decided upon the
formation of a party whose main concern would be to ‘free Barotseland from UNIP
rule and make it not a part of Northern Rhodesia’ (Caplan, 1970: 198). When the
party was formed in June, this major aim was reflected in its objectives, which read:
... to protect, defend and preserve the protectorate status of Barotseland ... the
Barotseland Kingship and to fight for the separation of Barotseland from Northern
Rhodesia (Northern News, 18th October, 1962).
The party failed to defeat UNIP in two successive elections, however,(20) and thus
failed to demonstrate mass support for the secession bid (as planned) to the coloniz-
ing power. This must have been a big blow to the ‘litunga’ and Council over their
secessionist hopes. And their hopes must have been completely shattered when its
President following Britain’s continued rejection of the idea and when a planned
alliance with ANC aborted dissolved the BNP. They, therefore, must have seen the
‘Agreement’ as the only possible alternative to their problem.
In terms of it contents, the Barotseland Agreement provided for the Zambian
Government’s upholding of human rights and fundamental freedoms among the
people of Barotseland and recognition of the litunga’s powers. It is significant to
note that its provisions amounted to retention of the local autonomy that the area
had enjoyed during the colonial era. For with powers of government and administra-
tion bestowed upon the ‘litunga’ (in almost every facet of life)(21) and that of law
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making, it is not surprising that the ‘litunga’ went along with it. This is the more so
that it portrayed a semblance of permanency thus:
And whereas, having regard to the fact that all treaties and other agreements subsisting
between Her Majesty the Queen ... and the Litunga of Barotseland will terminate when
Northern Rhodesia becomes an independent sovereign republic and Her Majesty’s
Government ... will thereupon cease to have any responsibility for the government of
Northern Rhodesia, including Barotseland, it is the wish of the Government of
Northern Rhodesia and the Litunga of Barotseland to enter into arrangements concern-
ing the position of Barotseland as part of the Republic of Zambia to take the place of
treaties and other arrangements hitherto subsisting between Her Majesty the Queen
and the Litunga of Barotseland.
And whereas on the sixteenth day of April, 1964 a provisional agreement was con-
cluded at Lusaka with this purpose ... it is the desire of the Government of Northern
Rhodesia and the Litunga ... to conclude a permanent agreement with this purpose
(Emphasis supplied). (Appendix 2).
Another assurance regarding the permanency of the ‘Agreement’ is contained in a
speech presented to the Litunga, chiefs and people of Barotseland by Dr. Kaunda at
Lealui (the Litunga’s capital) on the 6th of August 1964. Kaunda was explaining
changes that were then taking place in the country. And speaking on the planned
appointment of Under Ministers for provinces generally and on the functions of the
one to be based in Barotseland in particular, he had this to say:
An Under Minister will be appointed to each province as the personal representative of
the Prime Minister and after independence of the President. In Barotseland the Under
Minister will be a direct link between the Litunga and the Central Government ... will
be particularly responsible to the Prime Minister ... to ensure that the Barotseland
Agreement ... is being honoured. It will be no part of the functions of the Under
Minister to interfere in the day to day running of the Barotse Government... (Emphasis
supplied).
The none interference factor was twice repeated during his speech, when dis-
cussing the role of the Political Assistant to the Under Secretary (who too was yet to
be appointed) and when making reference to the ‘Barotseland Agreement’ itself.
Concerning the latter he said:
... I can assure you, Sir Mwanawina, and all Members of the Barotse Royal Family and
of the Barotse Government, that the Government has no wish to interfere with the day
to day running of the internal affairs of Barotseland. This is the responsibility of the
Barotse Government ... the intention of the Central Government will be no more than
to give to the Barotse Government its maximum assistance and cooperation.
I can give an absolute assurance that the customary rights in land in Barotseland will
remain with the Litunga and National Council, and the District Heads of Kutas...
Government is satisfied that Government requirements for land for development pro-
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jects in Barotseland will receive the active co-operation of the Barotse Government
(Emphasis supplied).
Despite these assurances, however, the Barotse Agreement never lasted. For the
Kaunda Government systematically eroded it through a series of legislative mea-
sures and finally had it abrogated in 1969. The first was the1965 Local Government
Act that repealed the Barotse Native Authority Ordinance and thereby abolished the
Barotse National Council. The second was the1966 Local Courts Act that repealed
the Barotse Native Courts Ordinance and changed the judicial functioning of the
indigenous courts in the province. The third was the 1969 Mines and Minerals Act
which deprived the ‘Litunga’ of his mineral rights which were inherent in agree-
ments with the British South African Company. The fourth was the 1969
Constitution of Zambia Amendment Act (No. 5). The last one was the Western
Province Land and Miscellaneous Provisions Act (No. 47) which took away the
Litunga’s powers over land, forests, fishing, wildlife, etc. and vested them in the
president.
The abrogation of the ‘Agreement’ led to discontent among the people of the
province, which has persisted to this day. This was not given great expression ini-
tially, however, allegedly because those who started doing so were silenced through
detention (Post Newspaper, 20/12/92).
The issue thus lay dormant until the advent of multi-party politics in 1990. And
its resuscitation brought anxieties upon both MMD and UNIP leaders during the run
up to the 1991 elections. It prompted the former to promise a reconsideration of the
issue if it won the elections and the latter to make similar gestures to the grieved
Lozi.
UNIP’s manoeuvres were particularly significant, if only because they came from
the same people who abrogated the ‘Agreement’. In the face of growing despon-
dency among Lozis and mounting opposition from the MMD, the then incumbent
president, Kaunda made repeated utterances indicating his readiness to discuss the
matter. He first did this at a public meeting at Senanga Boma in March 1992 (Post,
15/3/91) and again when he met a delegation of 38 chiefs and indents led by the
Ngambela (Prime Minister), the late Griffith Mukande at State House on the 26th of
June 1991 (Post, 27/6/91).
Having abrogated the ‘Agreement’ in the first place, when political power was
firmly under his grip, these good will gestures appear to have been occasioned by
political expediency, particularly that he did not seem to want to resolve the issue
until after the elections that were then envisaged and which actually took place on
the 31st of October that year.
The Lozi people saw this ploy and refused to fall prey to it. And coupled with
other grievances against the government of the day. such as shortages of essential
commodities, high cost of mealie meal, the government’s intolerance of other peo-
ple’s views, they voted en-mass for the MMD on account of its promises of ‘democ-
racy’, ‘transparency’, and ‘good governance’.
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THE LOZI PEOPLE AND ELECTORAL POLITICS: 1991-1996
MMD promises prior to the 1991 election raised great expectations among the
people of Western Province. Close to their hearts was the prospect of restoring their
abrogated ‘Agreement’. Contrary to expectation, however, the defeat of UNIP and
the rise to power of the MMD did not bring the controversy over the abrogated
‘Agreement’ to an end. Instead, it led to a series of unfruitful manoeuvres and tac-
tics on the part of both the Barotse Royal Establishment and the government aimed
at resolving the issue. These included uncontained recourse to court action (on the
part of the Royal Establishment), dialogue, threats, and counter threats.
While dialogue was considered by both to be the best suited method of resolving
the issue amicably, it failed to do so because the conflicting parties took uncompro-
mising stances. The Royal Establishment wanted the ‘Agreement’ to be restored in
its totality, whereas the government considered certain provisions as being absolute
and that they did not, therefore, merit restoration. By pursuing these diametrically
parallel viewpoints, no settlement was reached, and the grieved party became
increasingly disenchanted with the status quo. This was exacerbated by the govern-
ment’s alleged incitement of the Nkoya against the Lozi administration. And
although frequently denied by the Royal Establishment, the idea of secession began
not only to be conceived but also to be given expression by certain elements among
Lozi loyalists (Post, 20/2/92).
The issue of disenchantment seems to be evidenced by the Royal Establishment’s
reported decision of May 1996 to back Kaunda and UNIP in the elections that were
due later that year. Since Kaunda is the man who abrogated the ‘Agreement’ in the
first place, and is the same one who promised to witness for the state against the
Lozis in the event of the matter being brought before a court of law, the Royal
Establishment’s decision to back him must have been prompted by a feeling of
extreme despondency against those in power. This is notwithstanding the fact that
the man is said to have apologised for the action he took and the view some people
have that he (Dr. Kaunda) would probably turn out to be like Lewanika if he
regained power.(22) For had the Royal Establishment not been disillusioned with the
government, they would not have felt the need to reconsider the position of Dr.
Kaunda and UNIP who they know to be responsible for the Agreement’s abrogation.
Although this disenchantment is mainly linked to the government’s failure to re-
instate the ‘Barotse Agreement’, it has three other significant causal factors to it as
well, especially when the issue of disaffection for the status quo is extended to the
ordinary people in the province. These are the sale/liquidation of parastatal compa-
nies, stagnation in development and the enactment of the Land Act of 1995. The
sale/liquidation of parastatals like the National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAM-
BOARD) had a telling effect on the people of the province. Apart from throwing
some of them in the streets through loss of jobs (Appendix 1), it deprived many oth-
ers of essential services such as the provision of agricultural inputs, purchase of agri-
cultural produce, marketing of various consumer goods, etc.(23) Coupled with
stagnation in development (particularly in the area of road construction and mainte-
nance) and the enactment of the Land Act, these things caused the people a great deal
of grief, which ultimately led to their loss of affection for those in power.
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The extent of the people’s antagonism to the Land Act can probably be gauged
from the great criticism it received from Mutangelwa Mbikusita (of the Barotse
Cultural Association) and Moses Mwala (a prominent Mongu businessman) when it
was still at Bill stage. Mbikusita spoke of it as being ‘definitely a reappearance of
the ugly face of 1969 referendum to the people of Barotseland’ and predicted that its
implementation will be resisted by people ‘because it (land) is their livelihood.
There will be clashes’. And Mwala also went beyond mere criticism of the Bill
through his castigation of the President for it. It would be ‘very serious’ for the gov-
ernment to pass the Bill, he stated. ‘It is against the will of God.... It does not matter
what they want, this is our land. Even President Chiluba was given his own patch of
land in Luapula. What does he want with ours?’ (Post, 14/10/94).
The disaffection was first demonstrated by the government’s defeat in three par-
liamentary by-elections that were held in the province in 1993 following the forma-
tion of National Party (NP) by former MMD parliamentarians.(24) Because the MMD
victory in 1991 was overwhelming in the constituencies concerned, this defeat is
testimony that its popularity had drastically declined among the people of the
province over the two-year period. This is the more so that government had put up a
determined campaign to retain the seats.
The loss of support for the government by the Lozis had its parallels among the
traditional rulers and peoples of other provinces as well– albeit in varying degrees.
This is evidenced by the defeat of MMD candidates in various parliamentary and
Local Government by-elections in some of the other provinces (as was the case in
Western province) after the 1991 historic elections which brought them into power,
and the utterances of several chiefs over the disputed 1996 Constitution and the
1995 Land Act. Parliamentary election defeats were experienced in North-Western
Province (2), Southern (1), Central (1) and Northern (2). This shows that peoples’
disenchantment with the government was not confined to Bulozi alone.
While the defeats do not portray any form of disillusionment with the government
on the part of chiefs in the other provinces of the country, the utterances of some of
the chiefs there point to that kind of phenomenon. Examples of such utterances
include those of Chief Malembeka of Ndola Rural, Chief Macha of the Tonga and
Paramount Chief Mpezeni of the Ngoni. Speaking on behalf of a chiefs’ grouping
known by the term ‘Royal Foundation’, for example, chief Malembeka and his
counterpart, Chieftainess Nkomeshya of the Soli in Lusaka, expressed their displea-
sure with government on two counts: the President’s alleged refusal to meet them
(chiefs) and its enactment of the “Land Act” against the people’s wishes’ (Post,
2/11/95). The utterances of Chief Macha (Post, 18/9/96) and paramount Chief
Mpezeni (Post, 2/9/96) were by no means less explicit, nor were they compromis-
ing. The former stated his unwillingness to see any version of the ‘Land Act’
because it had been rejected by his people; while the latter castigated the govern-
ment over the ‘Constitution’, the ‘Land Act’ and the eight UNIP detainees (who
were later prosecuted and found innocent) who he said were ‘only arrested for being
UNIP.’ He underlined his disgust with the government by suggesting that ‘people
should be told to vote for other parties’.
And ceiling the chiefs’ disillusionment with the government was their decision
not to take part in elections unless their suggested amendments to the Constitution
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were effected (Post, 2/9/96). Made through their ‘Foundation’, following three of its
meetings in Kasama, Monze and Kabwe, this decision was a follow-up to yet
another radical statement by the Ngoni paramount on 3rd November 1996. Urging
other chiefs to champion their peoples’ demands, the chief reportedly said the fol-
lowing:
We are chiefs because of the people. We cannot do what people do not want. Power is
the people and what people don’t want, chiefs too don’t want  (Post, 7/11/96).
Mpenzeni was apparently referring to the rejection of the 1996 Constitution by
many groups of people in the country.(25) And it is interesting to note that the chiefs’
petition which followed this call contained a stinging indictment of what they saw
as an ‘MMD imposed Constitution’, which they attacked for being centralist and
highly tyrannical in relation to ‘traditional tribal kingdoms’ (Post, 17/11/96).(26)
Disillusionment with the government is not the only thing that the Lozis seem to
have shared with people in other provinces during this time. There are several
appreciable things that they had in common with them. The first is that of the
increase in transport facilities. Whereas previously people had to wait for days at
bus stops in order to board a bus, or were sometimes forced to travel as standing
passengers from Kaoma to Lusaka, for instance, due to shortage of transport vehi-
cles, this sort of experience ended when the MMD came to power. Availability of
transport was thus among the things informants highly credited the present govern-
ment with. Availability of consumer goods was another. With so many commodities
at district centres, people at such centres have access to almost any consumer item
they may require – unlike the time of the Second Republic, when many consumer
goods were scarcely available most of the time. It is important to stress here, how-
ever, that this shared experience mostly involved the province’s district centres’
since they were the ones where such goods were found. People in the remote areas
had problems in getting access to them as they had to walk long distances (more
than a day in some instances) to get to them. The third is that of ‘Freedom of
Speech.’ People begun to freely express their views over political and other matters
when the MMD took power. The increased enjoyment of this ‘Right’ in the 1991-96
period was attested to by both the questionnaire respondents and interviewees dur-
ing data collection, although there were indications that some people received
threatening letters from some government officers for exercising this ‘Right’.(27)
Apart from discussing Lozi-MMD Government relations; and their reflections in
some other provinces, this section of the study deals with three other issues of rele-
vance to the electoral process as well. These are: the extent of attachment Lozis still
have for their traditional rulers, these people’s commitment to freedom of choice
and the Royal Establishment’s lassies-faire attitude towards the parties that con-
tested the November, 1996 elections. They are dealt with in the three sub-sections
that follow.
I. Lozi People’s Strong Support for Traditional Authority
Results of the administered questionnaire revealed that the Lozi Royal
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Establishment enjoys strong support among its people. For, out of the 426 people
who responded to a question requiring them to indicate how strongly they believed
in traditional issues/authority, 62.4% said ‘very strongly,’ 16.9% said ‘strongly’ and
only 15.5% and 5.2% said ‘not so much’ and ‘not at all’ respectively (Table 1).
It is significant to note that of the three districts where the questionnaire was
administered (Kaoma, Mongu and Senanga), Kaoma recorded the highest percent-
ages of adherence to the Royal Establishment, with 77.3% and 14.4% of the respon-
dents indicating their belief in traditional authority as ‘very strongly’ and ‘strongly’
respectively, as opposed to the Mongu respondents’ corresponding percentage fig-
ures of 52.4 and 26.2 respectively or Senanga’s 54.4 and 16.7. This is surprising in
view of the ethnic conflicts which have existed in Kaoma between the Nkoya and
Lozi over the past five years or so. For normally, one would have expected the
Nkoya to indicate little or no regard whatsoever for the Royal Establishment’s
authority and thereby significantly reduce the positive percentages accorded to it
(the Royal Establishment). And while it may be argued that these people had their
own ‘local chiefly establishments’ in mind when making the responses, this does not
seem to be entirely so for two reasons. First because a seemingly similar pattern
emerged in the results of another question which specifically mentioned the Barotse
Royal Establishment. This is where Kaoma again tops the other districts with 33.3%
of the people indicating that they would accept a directive by the Royal
Establishment to vote for candidates who are not of their own choice; when the cor-
responding figures for Mongu and Senanga are 26.2% and 27.5% respectively
(Table 2). And second because some Nkoya people are said to have taken part in
celebrative dances that marked the installation of the new Lozi senior chief
[Isiteketo] in the district despite earlier threats that they would not allow the
appointment of another Lozi chief there. In view of these facts, one may consider
these results as authenticating the often expressed view by Lozis generally and the
Royal Establishment in particular that the Nkoya are not really anti-Lozi but that
they are simply used by ‘other people’ to try and weaken the Royal Establishment.(28)
The Royal Establishment’s enjoyment of widespread support was attested to by
most of the people interviewed also. Highlighting the point, one interviewee
snapped: ‘Sizo salatwa sisinywa feela kibani basona’ meaning ‘Tradition is loved, it
is only spoiled by its owners’.(29) Several others pointed to the simultaneous response
to the 1995 sounding of the ‘Ngongi’ (a war alerting instrument) as proof of the
existence of such support for the traditional authority. This was when Lozis rose en-
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Table 1. Distribution of voters’ responses concerning their rating of their belief in traditional
issues/authority.
DISTRICT Very Strong Strong Not so much Not at all
Kaoma (194) 150 28 14 2
77.3% 14.4% 7.2% 1.0%
Mongu (84) 44 22 18 0
52.4% 26.2% 21.4% 0%
Senanga (148) 72 22 34 20
54.4% 16.7% 25.8% 15.2%
All three districts 266 72 66 22
combined (426) 62.4% 16.9% 15.5% 5.2%
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mass with weapons of various descriptions to defend the ‘Litunga’, upon hearing
that the government was about to arrest him.(30)
That the Royal Establishment still enjoys massive support after many years of
colonial and nationalist rule is a reflection of how good its rule had been. Mention
has already been made regarding the good welcome that was given to the Mbunda
upon their arrival by King’s Ngombala and Mulambwa. Because these were given
equality of treatment (by allowing them to participate fully in the affairs of the state)
and since this equality has been maintained by successive rulers since then, the
goodwill established between the two peoples has been unshakable. Similarly
upheld has been the prestige of the Royal Establishment in the eyes of the ‘new
comers,’ and the respect they command among them. And coupled with the rights
and freedoms assured to everyone in their society, the love that Lozis have mani-
fested for long towards their rulers has scarcely declined.
II. Lozi People’s Commitment to Freedom of Choice
Their support for traditional authority, notwithstanding, most Lozis would not
accept a directive from the Royal Establishment requiring them to vote for candi-
dates who are not of their own choice. This was manifested in their response to item
12 of the questionnaire, where 70% of the respondents indicated they would not
accept such a directive and only 30% said they would.
Though seemingly contradictory, since the same people showed that most of them
strongly believed in traditional authority, this attitude is far from being so. Their
refusal is in fact in line with their established practice in matters of appointments.
For, among the Lozi, appointments to positions of authority are made on the basis of
consultation and consensus.(31) Many of them would, therefore, find such kind of
directive totally unacceptable, unless it was in line with their own preferred choices.
It is interesting to note that this matter was clearly manifested by the results of the
Barotse National Council election 1963 (Sumbwa, 1964: 17-18) and the Northern
Rhodesia Legislative Council one of January 1964 (Sumbwa, 1964 : 18). Fought by
UNIP on a nationalist and developmental platform; and the Royal Establishment
backed BNP on provincialism and ethnic considerations, both were overwhelmingly
won by the former. This showed that most Lozis could not be influenced to vote
against what they considered to be in their great interest —even if the attempted
influence came from their Litunga.
120 ?????????
Table 2. Distribution of people’s would be responses to a directive by the Lozi Royal Establishment to
have them vote for candidates who are not of their own choice.
DISTRICT YES NO
Kaoma (192) 64 128
33.3% 66.7%
Mongu (84) 22 62
26.2% 73.8%
Senanga (138) 38 100
27.5% 72.5%
All three districts combined (414) 124 290
30% 70%
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This kind of commitment signifies the existence of an autochthonous type of
democracy among the Lozi. For, contrary to old-fashioned ideas that associated their
kingdom with feudalism and dictatorial tendencies, their system of appointments
was clearly democratic. It ensured a great deal of dialogue among the people when
choosing their leaders, which often led to the right people being picked to run their
affairs. This is neatly evidenced by the list of ‘litungas’ who ruled the kingdom prior
to the coming of the Kololo, as the great majority of them were renowned for vari-
ous things (such as kindness, militarism and conquests, law making, etc) for which
they were loved by their subjects (Jalla, 1969).
III. The Royal Establishment’s Neutral Stand Towards the Elections
Mention was made of the Barotse Royal Establishment’s promise to support
UNIP in last year’s elections. This promise became irrelevant when the party
decided to boycott the elections at the 11th hour. Whereas many would have
expected the Royal Establishment to transfer its support to Zambia Democratic
Congress (ZADECO) —which had likewise promised to look into the issue of the
abrogated ‘Agreement’ if elected; and was the party which had become the main
competitor to MMD among the remaining parties, the National Party, or its splinter
group—Agenda for Zambia Party (which is led by a Lozi prince), they did nothing
of the sort. Instead, they took a neutral stand; on account of their lack of trust in the
parties that took part in the election race.
THE MMD-UNIP CONTEST FOR SUPPORT: ELECTORAL POLITICS BEFORE
THE UNIP BOYCOTT
This section of the study has five sub-sections. The first is on the unpredictability
of the election results; the second and third on the MMD Government’s ratings (in
terms of development and Human Rights promotion), the fourth on fears regarding
the freedom and fairness of elections, while the fifth and last is on the rise in UNIP’s
election ratings.
I. The Unpredictability of Last Year’s Election Results during the Early Stage of the
Study
The 1996 elections were highly unpredictable during the early part of the study.
The narrowness of the differences in the number of voters who showed preferences
for the two major parties —the ruling MMD and the main opposition UNIP and their
leaders when feeling in the questionnaire portrayed this. The differences in the sup-
port accorded to the two parties and their leaders were highly insignificant (Tables 3
& 4).
For even though President Chiluba and his party appeared to be in the lead
according to these statistics, this was not a true reflection of what the election results
were likely to be. This is because his rating and that of his party were boosted by
about 60 solid and supportive entries obtained from the Nkoya respondents found at
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the palaces of chiefs Mutondo and Kahare. Without these entries, the differences in
the number of voters preferring his party as against those for Dr. Kaunda and UNIP
would certainly have been minimal. Moreover, it is important to note that even if the
Nkoyas would have overwhelmingly voted for the president and the MMD in the
elections as demonstrated, that alone would not have guaranteed their win at all.
This is on account of their (the Nkoya people) smallness of number. They are such a
minority compared to other groupings in the district, such as the Mbunda and Lozi
that the factor of their solidarity alone could hardly have made a difference.
The unpredictability factor was further shown by the existence of a large number
of voters who indicated that their choice of candidates was to be based on the ability
or caliber of those standing rather than on party affiliation (Table 3).
What this implied was that any party (particularly the two major ones) had good
chances of winning parliamentary seats as long as they selected candidates whom
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Table 4. Distribution of voters’ responses regarding their preferences among the presidential candidates.
DISTRICT F.T.J. CHILUBA K.D. KAUNDA H. MULEMBA D. MUNG’OMBA
Kaoma (182) 110 56 10 6
60.4% 30.8% 5.5% 3.3%
Mongu (76) 30 42 2 2
39.5% 55.3% 2.6% 2.6%
Senanga (114) 42 54 6 12
36.8% 47.4% 5.3% 10.5%
All three districts 182 152 18 20
combined (372) 48.9% 40.9% 4.8% 5.4%
Table 5. Distribution of voters’ responses regarding what their greatest wish was.
DESCRIPTION OF THE WISH NO. / % OF RESPONSES
The return of the MMD government under President Chiluba 42
35.3%
A return of UNIP to power 144
35.8%




Table 3. Distribution of voters’ responses regarding their party preferences for the Parliamentary elec-
tions.
DISTRICT MMD UNIP NP ZADECO PARTY WITH
THE BEST CANDIDATE
Kaoma (200) 90 40 10 2 58
45.0% 20.0% 5.0% 1.0% 29.0%
Mongu (82) 22 26 4 2 28
26.8% 31.7% 4.9% 2.4% 34.1%
Senanga (144) 30 34 6 8 66
20.8% 23.6% 4.2% 5.6% 45.8%
All the three districts 142 100 20 12 152
combined (426) 33.3% 23.5% 4.7% 2.8% 35.7%
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the electorate were happy with.
This polarization of voters’ views on which candidates they would vote for,
reflected the absence of a party and/or party leader with a massive following in the
province at the time. For although MMD and UNIP were acknowledged as the
major parties, both had tarnished images in the minds of many of the province’s vot-
ers. This is certainly why both of them had less than 40% of the questionnaire
respondents indicating willingness to have them returned to power (Table 5). And
the closeness of the percentages of those preferring MMD and those in support of
UNIP (i.e. 35.3 and 35.8% respectively) tend to show that the two parties were
almost equally unpopular.
Many interviewees and group discussants gave indications as to why both parties
were not popular. Some blamed the governing MMD for its failures in developing
the province (see next section). Others recalled the hardships experienced during the
Second Republic – queuing for essential commodities, searches at road blocks, lack
of freedom of speech, transport problems, night curfews and arrests, etc. and said
that they detested UNIP’s return to power which they believed would lead to a
resuscitation of such things.
II. The MMD Government’s Poor Performance in the Field of Development
The people of Western Province are very dissatisfied with the government’s per-
formance in the area of development. Only 22.8% and 18.4% of the questionnaire
respondents gave the government ratings of ‘very good’ and ‘good’ respectively, in
respect of its performance in the development of the country generally, while those
who rated this performance negatively had a combined percentage rate of 58.8% of
the people involved (Table 6).
The government’s poor performance ratings in respect of the province and its dis-
tricts/constituencies were even worse. Those for the constituencies, for instance,
show 12.6% and 8.3% under the ‘very good’ and ‘good’ categories respectively, and
18.0% and 61.2% under the bad and ‘very bad’! Evidence in support of this fact was
found among interviewees and group discussants. People generally talked of the
lack of development under the MMD government and referred to the absence of
new projects in their areas as evidence. Some of them pointed to the none construc-
tion of new roads (apart from the then uncompleted Kaunga-Mashi gravel one) and
the none repair of existing ones as further evidence. Reference was consistently
made to the Lusaka-Mongu road’s deplorable state in particular, as a way of under-
scoring their arguments.
123Traditionalism, Democracy and Political Participation in Zambia
Table 6. Distribution of voters’ ratings of the government’s performance in development of the country,
the province and the constituencies.
DEVELOPMENTAL AREA VERY GOOD GOOD POOR VERY POOR TOTAL
Country 94 76 112 130 412
22.8% 18.4% 27.2% 31.6% 100%
Province 46 46 80 238 410
11.2% 11.2% 19.5% 58.0% 100%
Constituency 52 34 74 252 412
12.6% 8.3% 18.0% 61.2% 100%
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Some people attributed the government’s poor performance to the lack of money.
This was particularly the case with MMD supporters who argued that their party
found ‘government coffers’ empty when it took over government and that this made
it difficult to finance the rehabilitation of the greatly dilapidated infrastructure they
found.
While there is some grain of truth in this viewpoint, many other people took great
exception to it for various reasons. First they dismissed the ‘empty coffers’ argument
on the enormity of donor funds that flowed into the country following the setting up
of a democratic government in 1991. Such funds, they contented, should have made
a great deal of difference had they been well utilized. Second, they pointed to the
government’s abandonment of subsidy payments, which were a major feature of life
in the Second Republic. This reduced the areas of government’s budgetary alloca-
tions, they stated, which government revenue should have managed to appreciably
cater for. Third (in the case of the Western Province in particular), the factor of neg-
ligence was given as having contributed to the phenomenon. The province, they
argued was scarcely developed due to its negligence by the MMD government.
Some subscribers to this view, referred to the better road structures elsewhere in the
country as proof of this. ‘Those roads are fantastic’ remarked one interviewee,
‘compared to the Lusaka-Mongu one which is neglected’. And speaking on the same
issue, one man asked: ‘Does the government only lack money where Bulozi
(Western Province) is concerned?  No money for the Lusaka-Mongu road, none for
the Livingstone-Sesheke one,(32) none for the Lukulu and Kalabo roads ... when
theirs are being worked on?  I cannot believe this.’
Besides negligence, some people attributed the shortcomings in the government’s
developmental performance to economic mismanagement and gave specific exam-
ples to back their contention. It is interesting to note that several of these involved
road contractors some of whom achieved virtually nothing in their undertakings.
One of these only had trees cut on either side of a 12km stretch of the gravel road he
was supposed to widen and resurface. He then abandoned the project when his
workers left him for his failure to pay them! Apart from emphasizing the harm such
kind of contractors cause to development, they also castigated those who appoint
them for not being serious with the issue.(33)
The poor developmental performance constituted an electioneering problem for
the ruling party. This was the more so in the agricultural sector where the lack of
marketing facilities for farmers as a result of the government’s liberalization policy
is a matter of great concern to people. It is significant to note that even some ruling
party members considered this matter unhealthy. Explaining that lack of marketing
for agricultural products was one of the major issues they found difficult to defend, a
group of District Executive Committee (DEC) members in one of the districts stated
that there was need to reconsider government policy on this issue. This was impor-
tant, they said, because the majority of farmers were poor peasants who either
lacked knowledge of available markets or were unable to transport their produce to
such markets even if they knew where these were.
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III. The Favourable Ratings of the Government’s Human Rights Record
People in the province rated the MMD government’s Human Rights record very
well. This was especially so in the area of Freedom of Speech where 61.3% of the
questionnaire respondents gave it a ‘very good’ rating and 21.2% that of ‘good’
(Table 7). Quite high ratings were also given in respect of the other rights, as can be
seen from the table.
Although favourably rated, it is important to take note of the sizable percentages
of respondents with negative ratings in some aspects of this area; such as those relat-
ing to ‘Freedom of the Press’ and that of ‘the Independence of the Judiciary.’ These
(the negative ratings) seem to imply that there are people who perceive some inade-
quacies in the government’s upholding of these Rights/Freedoms. And this is not
surprising. As some people in the study areas listen to the radio, read papers and
have access to television, a number of them are bound to share some of the senti-
ments expressed in these media regarding shortcomings in the maintenance of such
rights.
Equally important is taking note of the perceived weakness themselves. This is
necessary in that it will enable government to take measures that will help remedy
the situation. The importance of this needs no emphasis, since good governance, of
which the upholding of Human Rights is an important ingredient, is necessary for
both the stability of the nation and the satisfying of the donor countries’ demands.
IV. People’s Fears Concerning the Freedom and Fairness of Last Year’s Elections
One of the main concerns some people initially had regarding last year’s elections
was that they were not going to be free and fair. This was the feeling of 52.2% of
respondents to the questionnaire (Table 8). They feared two things, political strife
and the likelihood of vote rigging.
The fear of political strife was based on various factors including the following.
The first was the Government’s envisaged barring of ‘Kaunda’(34) from standing in
the elections. Then anticipated, due to the arguments that were raging over the
method of adopting the 1996 Constitution, the issue of barring some people from
standing for the Presidency actually became a reality when the relevant Bill was
passed by Parliament and subsequently assented to by the President during the
course of the year. The second was lack of dialogue between the ruling MMD and
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Table 7. Distribution of voters’ ratings of the government’s performance in the upholding of Human
Rights.
DESCRIPTION OF RIGHT/FREEDOM VERY GOOD GOOD POOR VERY POOR
Freedom of speech (424) 260 90 42 32
61.3% 21.2% 9.9% 7.5%
Freedom of the press (392) 126 122 56 88
32.1% 31.1% 14.3% 22.4%
Freedom of Assembly (388) 140 88 60 100
36.1% 22.7% 15.5% 25.8%
Independence of the Judiciary (382) 152 74 76 80
39.8% 19.4% 19.9% 20.9%
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the opposition parties. The third factor was the violence between the parties. This
was in reference to the violence that took place between MMD and UNIP supporters
during the Mkaikwa Parliamentary by-election. The fourth factor was the MMD’s
determination to remain in power while the fifth factor was Kaunda’s insistence on
standing for the Presidency even if the law was to bar him.
The fear of rigging appeared to affect very many people. This is evidenced by the
fact that, 66.0% and 14.4% of the questionnaire respondents indicated ‘strongly
agree’ and ‘agree’ respectively to indicate their positive reactions to the suggestion
that counting of votes be done at polling stations to reduce this danger; while the
percentages of those who ‘disagreed’ or ‘strongly disagreed’ were as little as 9.6%
and 10.0% respectively (Table 9).
V. UNIP’s Favourable Election Ratings in the Later Stage of the Study
Although the election results seemed unpredictable at the commencement of the
study, the election chances of UNIP significantly improved in the course of time.
This was as a result of increased politicization in the province by the party president
Dr. Kaunda and other senior party leaders as well as the aspiring candidates in the
various constituencies. These capitalized on the disillusionment of the people
towards the government as a result of the lack of a ready market for their maize;
high cost of commodities generally and agricultural inputs in particular, unemploy-
ment, retrenchments, and (in the case of the Barotse Royal Establishment and the
Barotse Cultural Association) the government’s failure to restore the abrogated
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Table 9. Distribution of voters’ responses to the suggestion that votes be counted at polling stations to
reduce the chances of vote rigging.











Table 8. Distribution of voters’ responses to the question on whether the elections were to be free and
fair.
DISTRICT YES NO
Kaoma (174) 104 70
59.8% 40.2%
Mongu (82) 30 52
36.6% 63.4%
Senanga (146) 58 88
39.7% 60.2%
All three districts combined (402) 192 210
47.8% 52.2%
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‘Barotseland Agreement’. They were also helped by their superb party structure,(35)
which enabled them to easily get their message down to the grassroots and by the
ultimate decision of the Barotse Royal Establishment to back them.
Manifestations of the party’s re-emerged popularity came in two ways through the
large numbers of people who flocked to Kaunda’s rallies and through the party’s
successes in most local government by-elections that were contested in the province
at the time. These included four in Kaoma, which brought their number of coun-
cilors from one, which they had won during the full council elections to five.
The party’s revamped strength was even acknowledged by a group of the ruling
party’s District Executive Committee (DEC) members in one of districts.
Confessing that they would have found it extremely difficult to win any of the seats
in the district had UNIP participated, they attributed the reasons for this to among
other things that party’s superior organizational structure, the cooperation of its
members,(36) the fact that it did not impose aspiring candidates on the people and the
failure of the then MMD MPs to visit their constituencies.(37)
THE UNIP WITHDRAWAL AND THE MMD-ZADECO DOMINANCE OF THE
ELECTION CAMPAIGNS
The 1996 election boycott by UNIP and a number of other opposition parties was
one of the major occurrences associated with that exercise. It was prompted by the
government’s final decision to hold the elections under the disputed 1996
Constitution and using the NIKUV Register, which the opposition parties had con-
sistently been opposed to. This section of the study looks at the success or failure of
this boycott and its resulting dominance of the election campaigns by the ruling
MMD and ZADECO.
I. The UNIP Boycott
The question of whether or not the UNIP boycott was successful, has been dis-
cussed by people everywhere in the province. Most of those interviewed felt that the
boycott was not only unsuccessful but also ill conceived. The fact that the election
exercise went on as planned with many people casting their votes, they said, portray
the success of the exercise; and consequently, the futility of the boycott. UNIP, they
contented would have won most, if not all the seats in the province, had the party
participated in the polls.
The reasons advanced in support of their claim were: the ruling party’s alleged
unpopularity among the people; the absence of an opposition party stronger than
UNIP, which people could have embraced as an alternative to the ruling MMD;
UNIP’s track record which many believed was in various ways better than that of
the ruling party; UNIP’s successful performances in various Local Government by-
elections prior to the elections and the success of two UNIP members who defied
the boycott decision and stood as independents in the Parliamentary elections in
their constituencies.
Notwithstanding the above, however, UNIP officials maintained that their boycott
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was successful, arguing that most of their supporters refrained from voting. This
claim appears to be supported by statistical data on the election results in some
polling districts such as Litambya, where only 258 or 33.5% of the 771 registered
voters cast their votes.(38) Since the polling district is situated within the boundaries
of the district’s administrative centre, it is obvious that the UNIP members here got
the boycott message (unlike some of their colleagues in the remotest areas) and
could have decided to stay away from the polls as instructed by their party leaders.
Although supported, the claim regarding the boycott’s success does not seem
entirely convincing for the following reasons. The first is that the overall number of
people who voted in the parliamentary elections was larger than that of those who
did not. Although the difference between the two was insignificant, it is important to
note that those who voted were above 50% (actually 53.48%) (Times of Zambia,
18/12/96) of the total registered voters in the province. Moreover, the number of
those who stayed away could, to a great extent, have been due to the usual apathy
that have characterized by-elections in the post 1991 elections period. This is evi-
denced by the results of Lukulu East Constituency, where the number of people who
stayed away was quite large about 40%, despite the fact that ordinary UNIP mem-
bers there had resolved to and actually supported the UNIP independent in spite of
the boycott.(39) The second is that UNIP has failed to release the figures of surren-
dered voters’ cards by their supporters to help authenticate their claim to the effec-
tiveness of the boycott exercise. The third is that the intended purpose of the boycott
has not materialized since the elections took place as planned and life has remained
normal ever since. Critics of UNIP’s election boycott particularly expressed the last
point. But the party concerned took a different view. The election dispute was not
over, according to them; and they pointed to the court case over the president’s citi-
zenship as a matter in point. They were confident that another election, which was to
be based on an acceptable constitution and voters’ role, was bound to take place this
year. ‘History’, as one of them rightly observed, ‘will be the judge over this issue’.
II. The Domination of the Election Campaigns by MMD and ZADECO
In the absence of UNIP, the election campaign was dominated by the MMD and
ZADECO in most of the constituencies. This was characterized by their coverage of
all areas of the province addressing meetings and distributing campaign posters.
This is because they had more resources than any of their competitors. Their abun-
dant resources enabled them not only to travel to many areas of each constituency
for campaign purposes; but also to set up and pay campaign teams,(40) purchase cam-
paign materials and allegedly, ‘bribe’ voters as well.
The alleged use of resources to ‘bribe’ voters was among the main complaints of
some of the smaller parties; some of which referred to the slaughtering of cattle by
these two parties to feed potential voters in various areas within the campaign
period.  References were also made to a K5 million cheque that one aspiring candi-
date gave to a church congregation at the end of their service saying it was a dona-
tion from the President. The timing of this alleged donation was seen as having been
designed to influence voters in favour of that particular candidate and the President
who was seeking re-election. The same is true of some school requisites that were
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delivered in some schools shortly before elections when these had been in the dis-
trict long before that time.(41)
The major problem of this inequality of access to resources by parties during elec-
tions is that it brings unfair competition in the election process. Parties with the least
means are greatly disadvantaged in many ways. They find it difficult to reach all the
potential voters to present their credentials, hire election agents to assist them or get
election materials made or printed. As a result, such parties and/or their candidates
may lose elections even if they were the best candidates in the race. Their disadvan-
taged position was clearly stated by an Agenda for Zambia candidate when he said:
‘I have support. The only problem is that as a new party we are not yet known... very
difficult to cover the constituency when you have no money and no transport. I carry
out my campaigns on foot and it is not easy. People in the areas I managed to touch are
very supportive.’
UNDEMOCRATIC TENDENCIES IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
The issue of bribery has been referred to as having featured during last year’s
election campaigns. This was but one of the features of undemocratic practices that
took place in relation to those elections. A number of others existed, which are dis-
cussed here under.
The first was the commencement of the campaigns long before the appropriate
time. For elections to be fair, there is need for all aspirants to have equal opportuni-
ties in carrying out the campaigns. This is not only true of the equality of access to
resources such as money, transport, electronic and print media, etc.; but that of the
time span of the campaigns as well. Unfortunately it was discovered in last year’s
elections that some people started their campaigns much earlier. An example of this
is that of a man who had engaged in timber cutting in an area of the constituency in
which he intended to stand; while subtly carrying out his campaign. This man is said
to have so effectively made a following that many people were allegedly heard say-
ing: ‘Had it been x, ... Had it been x, when they discovered that he was not among
the aspiring candidates owing to the UNIP boycott.
The second undemocratic practice was block voting. This is said to have occurred
during one of UNIP’s primary elections. Because the two candidates involved hap-
pened to belong to two different ethnic groups, some informants stated, each of the
groups in question rallied behind its tribesman. Once the winner was declared, how-
ever, the party members are said to have closed their ranks – ready to face their
opponents. This practice is not new, however. It used to feature in Kalabo Central
Constituency during the Second Republic when voters were often largely divided
between Mbunda and Lozi groupings. It once happened in Kaoma Central
Constituency as well, where a Mbunda-Lozi grouping is said to have been formed to
defeat a parliamentary candidate who allegedly campaigned on an anti-Lozi plat-
form. The candidate was of Lozi-Nkoya origin and had thrice won the seat with
Lozi support. His anti-Lozi stance then, was allegedly due to his ambition of having
a 10th province created – which was to group all Nkoya people and in which he was
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to have greater influence e.g. by being made its Member of the Central Committee.
Contrary to his expectation, however, his anti-Lozi stance cost him his political
career as he lost the election to his opponent. The problem with the block type of
voting is that it may rob constituents of a better representative, if the group backing
his less gifted opponent is numerically so strong that he loses the election. This
would inevitably lead to poor representation, which might result in retarded devel-
opment for that constituency.
The third such practice was the imposition of candidates by political parties. This
implies the selection by a party’s National Executive Committee (NEC) of a man or
woman to stand as a candidate in an election without the wish of party members in
the ward or constituency in which the election is to be held. This malpractice is said
to have occurred within the ruling party. Contrary to its policy of holding interviews
at District Executive Committee (DEC) level and then forwarding results to NEC
for ratification, the party allegedly sent two men who never attended such interviews
to contest elections in two of the constituencies. While this was tolerated by the gen-
eral party membership in the affected constituencies, it prompted one of the aspi-
rants to stand as an independent. ‘I had to do this’ he told me, ‘because the whole
thing was undemocratic’.
And some DEC members in whose district the other imposed candidate was, were
equally critical of the action. Discussing the relative strengths of the parties before
the UNIP boycott and being frank about the former ruling party’s strength, they had
this to say: ‘UNIP is the party we were worried about. To be frank, there is no con-
stituency we were hopeful of winning because our candidates were imposed. We
stay with the people and we know who they want to represent them’. They ended by
requesting me to remember to write this issue in order for leaders to ‘know this
problem’.
Fourthly there were also some cases of double voting. This matter was revealed
by a ZADECO party official who had served as campaign manager and election
agent for one of his party’s candidates in his district. He said this when giving rea-
sons as to why his party lost the elections despite their having been so confident of
winning. He gave double voting by some MMD supporters as one such reason. This
he said was revealed to him by a man who had so voted – using two voter’s cards
that bore similar details regarding names, NRC number, residential area but different
polling districts.(42)
Interference with opponents’ campaign meetings was another undemocratic prac-
tice. A National Party losing candidate brought this to light. His meeting was sched-
uled for 14 hours on 4th November 1996, he stated. Despite having had a police
permit, he said, some MMD cadres went to the venue about an hour earlier ‘ostensi-
bly to hold their own meeting but in reality to disrupt mine’.
Since there was a law requiring people to apply for police permits to hold meet-
ings seven days in advance (as there still is) collusions of this kind do not seem acci-
dental. They appear to be deliberate attempts to frustrate the process of democracy
in the area of political competition.
Delivery of insufficient ballot papers was yet another manifestation of this prob-
lem. This is alleged to have occurred in two polling districts of Nalolo Constituency.
An example of this is Nalolo poling District, which despite having 723 registered
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voters, had only 200 ballot papers delivered there. This resulted in many voters
being turned away, thereby denying them their right to choose both their parliamen-
tary representative and their Head of State. And the act of sending insufficient ballot
papers was seen by some people as a deliberate move to rob some popular candi-
dates in the areas concerned, of getting more votes. Whether this is true or not, the
action is definitely a deterrent to fairness in the elective process.
The last manifestation of undemocratic practices took the form of the use of
Government vehicles for campaign purposes. This was one further complaint some
opposition members made against the ruling party. Those particularly accused of the
practice were MMD parliamentary aspirants who had held ministerial positions
prior to the dissolution of parliament. These people were alleged to have continued
to use their ministerial vehicles for campaign purposes. This gave them an advan-
tage over their opponents; the more so that, their party, had the greatest resources
among those that took part in the elections.
THE ANALYSIS OF ELECTION RESULTS
Both the parliamentary and presidential election results registered some surprises.
They also brought certain claims by some parties into question – although results
obtained in other provinces seem to uphold such claims. Details of these results are
discussed in sub-sections 7.1 and 7.2 of this section.
I. The Parliamentary Election Results
The Parliamentary elections in the province were won by the MMD, which got 11
of the 17 seats at stake (one of them unopposed), while the remaining 6 went to
ZADECO, Agenda for Zambia Party and independents on an equal basis. While the
MMD triumph was not unexpected in the absence of UNIP, the success of the other
two parties and the independents was not so obvious to most people in the country.
ZADECO, like the National Party, was not rated highly by voters when they filled in
the questionnaire at the beginning of the study, Agenda for Zambia was newly born
and scarcely known among the people; while independents had no history of stand-
ing for, let alone winning elections ever since the time of independence.(43)
Consequently, the success of the two parties and the independents came as a sur-
prise to many. An analysis of the matter, however, tend to attribute this to three fac-
tors namely, some candidates’ previous records of good performance as MPs, some
candidates’ impressive credentials and some candidates’ fortune.
The two independents seem to have won due to their impressive records as MPs.
The popularity of both of them was portrayed during interviews prior to the holding
of the elections. In May, 1996 one interviewee referred favourably to one of them,
Mr. Crispin Sibetta, when talking about stagnation in the development of their area
since he left parliament:
‘There is no development taking place at the moment. Our schools are a testimony.
The projects which were initiated by Sibetta under the Luena Self-Help Association
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for Development (SHADE) have come to a stand still.’
That Mr. Sibetta was able to win back the seat even on an independent ticket is
easy to see. He had impressed his constituents through his achievements during his
previous term of office. This won him their confidence, which he still enjoyed five
years after he had left the office. It is important to note that his success and that of
his colleague (Mr. Luhana) in Lukulu East invalidated a claim by some MMD mem-
bers that the UNIP withdrawal was a result of fear of losing the elections.
Some of the small party aspirants won through their impressive CVs. This is true
of the winners of the Nalolo and Mongu Central Constituencies – Dr. Kasuka
Mutukwa and Dr. Inonge Mbikusita Lewanika respectively. Not only are the two
highly educated but they have impressive records of service both in the country and
abroad as well. The credentials, coupled with their owners’ impeccable records,
were bound to see the two win the seats they were contesting. This was the more so
that a significant portion of voters in each of the constituencies, believe in giving
their votes to aspirants they consider to be the best (Table 3), and that both these
candidates had resources of their own for use in campaigns.
While ‘fortune’ may sound far-fetched as a determining factor of electoral suc-
cess, this seems to have been at the core of the success that some of the opposition
candidates achieved in the last elections. Facing a ruling party candidate, who
allegedly was very unpopular for lack of performance during his term of office, one
opposition candidate is said to have succeeded in getting elected; mainly because he
was the only alternative person available. Fortune does not seem to have favoured
some opposition members only. It appears to have facilitated the going to parliament
of the ruling party’s unopposed candidate also. His MMD predecessor was allegedly
a no show MP i.e. that he never visited his constituency. Had UNIP taken part in the
elections, therefore, and put up a strong candidate, the result could probably have
been different. This is the more so that the unopposed MP had made several unsuc-
cessful attempts to get elected to Parliament before.
Another notable outcome of these elections was the total explipse of NP popular-
ity in the province. For, while the party came with a bang by beating the ruling party
in three crucial parliamentary by-elections in 1993, its fortunes begun to decline
thereafter. The decline was portrayed by its loss of various Local Government by-
elections and the Mwandi Parliamentary one. The party’s defeat in all the contested
seats in the November, 1996 elections, therefore, seems to have marked the ceiling
of its fame in that part of the country. This is the more so that the party had put up a
good number of ‘good candidates’ in the race. These included their party’s Vice-
President and one time Prime Minister, Mr. Daniel Lisulo; a retired Senior educa-
tionist and former District Governor; a degree holding – senior company employee
and a retired Postal Management employee.
This loss of popularity is generally attributed to the replacement of Dr. Inonge
Mbikusita Lewanika as party leader and the ‘failure’ of her successors to effectively
run the organization. The late Baldwin Nkumbula allegedly failed to undertake
scheduled visits to the province during his term as Party President, while Humphrey




II. The Presidential Election Results
One of the findings of these results was the authentication of the fact that
President Chiluba was unpopular among the Lozi. This was shown by his aggregate
poll of 40.50%, which, though the highest in the province, was far below those he
got from other provinces (Table 10).
This percentage poll also portrays him as being less popular, than the party he
leads; as the aggregate poll of the party’s candidates in the province is 47.79%
(Table 11).
Another notable factor about the race is the impressive performance of
Akashambatwa Mbikusita Lewanika. His winning 27.68% of the votes when his
party was less than two months old at the time of elections and coming second to the
president is greatly fascinating. This is in view of the great campaign that Dean
Mung’omba had put up, and his own (Lewanika’s) party’s inadequate resources to
carry out a similar campaign. For these factors could have seen Mung’omba win
second place.
While some people may explain this in ethnic terms i.e. that Lozi’s voted for him
for being one of them, this kind of explanation appears to be an oversimplification.
For, had this been the sole reason, he should have beaten the President as well. What
seems more probable, therefore, is the factor of the fight he had put up in Parliament
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Table 10. Presidential election percentage results by Province and Nationally.
Name of Central Copperbelt Eastern Luapula Lusaka Northern North- Southern Western National
Candidate province Western
Chakombok 5.00 1.61 5.71 1.94 1.88 3.75 2.19 4.42 3.64 3.13
a C.M.
Chiluba 69.62 81.94 60.28 82.44 68.95 77.38 50.19 63.60 40.50 68.96
F.J.T.
Mbikusita 2.06 0.92 3.27 4.75 2.65 1.19 1.46 4.44 27.68 4.47
Lewanika
A.
Mulemba 4.92 3.13 6.45 1.61 3.47 2.37 6.23 4.92 7.63 6.63
H.
Mung’omba 13.57 7.30 18.43 5.77 16.04 11.47 6.08 17.37 14.42 12.11
D.
TOTALS 95.17 94.90 94.13 96.51 93.99 96.16 96.15 94.74 93.87 95.00
Source: Times of Zambia, 18/12/96.
Table 11. Party parliamentary election percentage results by province and nationally.
Central Copperbelt Eastern Luapula Lusaka Northern North- Southern Western National
Western
MMD 47.97 69.48 58.90 68.26 61.24 60.66 43.01 54.67 47.79 58.52
ZADECO 9.31 8.95 23.15 10.34 14.83 12.46 7.48 18.74 15.66 13.26
NP 3.85 5.07 6.13 2.34 4.23 3.42 34.68 3.42 9.63 6.82
NLP 11.99 6.97 3.78 6.12 5.12 2.68 3.70 12.00 0.51 6.15
AZ – – – – 0.19 – – 1.21 14.38 1.43
Independents 23.02 7.07 2.17 10.15 9.48 17.02 8.09 4.58 7.97 9.45
Totals 96.30 95.77 95.11 97.30 95.25 96.23 96.95 95.89 95.94 95.98
Source: Times of Zambia, 18/12/96.
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in defence of democracy. Because this fight resulted in his expulsion from that insti-
tution, it gave him a heroic image, which may have prompted some people to con-
sider him more worthy of their support than the other opposition contestants.
Another possible explanation is the party’s use of the cultural dimension in their
campaign meetings. It was reported that many Agenda for Zambia supporters in
Mongu wore ‘misisi’ and ‘liziba’ – the traditional wear for women and men respec-
tively. This made such meetings conspicuous and must certainly have attracted a
good number of people to them; who in turn could have helped disseminate the mes-
sages they received.
The other surprises of this poll are the unexpectedly big number of votes
Chakomboka obtained in the province, and Mulemba’s dismal performance.
Chakomboka’s performance is surprising in so far as his party is more or less a ‘one
man organization’ and that, therefore, he certainly lacked campaigners in the
province under study. Mulemba’s is surprising because of the striking manner in
which his party came upon the province’s political scene barely three years back.
The reason for his poor performance is inherent in what has been said about his par-
ty’s loss of popularity in the parliamentary election results section of this paper. His
alleged lack of support for party organizers was clearly articulated by one party offi-
cial. At a closed meeting of party officials and National Party leaders (including
Mulemba) this official allegedly told the leaders after they had requested for com-
ments from them:
‘... We sometimes wonder whether our leader is the same Mulemba we knew (in refer-
ence to his leadership during the Second Republic) ... a formidable party organizer ...
moving, organizing and getting results.... Where are the bicycles we were promised for
party campaigns? How can we be expected to work wonders without resources?’
And in reply to a query by one of the party’s national executive leaders that it
wasn’t money or vehicles that mattered in the work but commitment, he replied:
‘What commitment are we talking about? Are we not here ... this time of the day (it
was night then). Isn’t this commitment?’
This official echoed what many others had told me concerning their conviction
that had Inonge retained the leadership of their party, its popularity would have
remained solid and that they would have swept all the seats in the province!
CONCLUSION
Since this study is three dimensional i.e. that it embraces three major issues (tradi-
tionalism, democracy and political participation), it is imperative that something be
said (albeit briefly) on the findings relating to each of them in order to highlight
them and/or their implications.
This study discovered three major things in respect of traditionalism. First, that
the Lozi people are still largely attached to their traditional authority (the Lozi Royal
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Establishment), second, their great attachment, notwithstanding, the majority of
them would not accept a directive by the Royal Establishment to vote for candidates
who are not of their own choice and thirdly, that both the Royal Establishment and
the people are generally disenchanted with both the Government and party in power.
The government’s failure to restore the abrogated ‘Barotseland Agreement’ emerged
as the basic factor behind the Royal Establishment’s disenchantment, while its poor
developmental performance seem to account for that of the ordinary people.
Manifested by the Royal Establishment’s April 1996 decision to support UNIP
(the ruling party’s major contender for power) in the then awaited elections, and
confirmed by the ruling party’s unimpressive performance in the actual polls (even
with the absence of its major rival), this disillusionment appears to be of sufficient
magnitude to warrant government’s proper attention. This is so for three reasons.
The first is that one of its causes (the abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement)
reportedly roused emotions among petitioners from the province that made submis-
sions concerning the subject to the Mwanakatwe Constitutional Commission. The
second is that both the Mwanakatwe Commission and its predecessor, the Mvunga
Commission, considered the Agreement as being complex and political and that it
had better be resolved by an authority/authorities other than themselves–the
Government and the Royal Establishment according to the Mwanakatwe one. The
third is that the Royal Establishment has actually begun to externalise the dispute
over the matter.(44)
It is significant to note that emotionalism was found among petitioners who sub-
mitted to the Mwanakatwe Commission and not among those who did so to the
Mvunga one five years previously; and that the Royal Establishment’s decision to
externalise the dispute was taken about six months after the controversial elections.
These factors seem to suggest growing impatience on the part of the grieved Lozis,
as does the kind of language employed in the dispute’s externalising document. This
being the case, the suggestion that the matter is significant enough to justify govern-
ment’s proper attention appears plausible.
It is important to note too that a senior government official recently announced
government’s intention to re-introduce ‘native authorities’ in the interest of devolu-
tion of power. The announcement was made by the Deputy-Minister for the Western
Province at a public meeting in Sesheke District. Since the ‘Barotseland Agreement’
upheld the right of the people of the province to continue with the administration of
their local affairs, it is to be seen whether this measure (if implemented) will amount
to a full restoration of the ‘Agreement,’ and to an extension of all its provisions to
the other provinces.
Such occurrences would, I believe, be greatly welcomed countrywide. Not only
would they help restore Lozi confidence in the status-quo and thereby ensure contin-
ued harmony in the nation; but that they would most probably satisfy the desires of
many other petitioners elsewhere in the country, who reportedly called for the estab-
lishment of a ‘Federal System of Government’ in the country – in their submissions
to the Mwanakatwe Commission. For, by being allowed to run their local affairs,
such people would have their desires fulfilled to a certain extent, even without a
complete Federal structure of administration in place.
The issues of democracy and political participation are intricately linked and
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hence will be discussed together. They are linked because the latter (political partici-
pation) is one of the basic elements, characteristics and/or requirements of the for-
mer (democracy). And since participation is itself dependent largely upon the
existence of individual liberties and freedoms, the state of democracy in the
province can be deduced from the findings of this study in respect of these things
and other factors of relevance.
The people’s enjoyment of individual liberties and freedoms appears to be quite
high; and so is their involvement in the electoral process. The 53.48% voter turn out
in last year’s elections is a matter in point. The figure involved is undoubtedly quite
high and the people it represents voted because they were free to exercise their right
in this regard. Moreover, it is very probable that a significant number of those who
did not vote were members of the ‘opposition alliance’, who likewise were exercis-
ing their right to stay away from the polls; as per their parties’ decision to do so.
This two-pronged high degree of electoral participation (i.e. positively through vot-
ing and negatively through staying away as a way of protest) and the enjoyment of
rights and freedoms that led to it, seem to correspondingly place the degree of
democracy in the province to the same high level. This rating is further justified by
the absence of various undemocratic tendencies that reportedly have taken place in
other countries during election periods. These include the employment of ethnicity
in election campaigns; coercion of voters and candidates, kidnappings of prospec-
tive candidates, prevention of aspiring candidates from launching their nomination
papers and election associated ethnic or party clashes (Bard-Anders, 1993:  14-17).
Though commendable, these good features of democracy were mingled with and
spoiled by the many undemocratic practices that were discovered by the study.
These are issues of bribery, imposition of candidates, double voting, interference
with opponents’ campaign meetings, delivery of insufficient ballot papers, etc. They
were further marred by the relative inaccessibility of opposition candidates to elec-
tronic and print media as compared to the ruling party ones. For, in last year’s elec-
tions, governing party candidates (especially the president and those who happened
to be ministers) had more access to these forms of media; and, consequently, had
their candidatures much more greatly sold to the electorate than those of their oppo-
nents. This disadvantaged the opposition candidates, especially that many of them
had no resources to enable them cover their constituencies in the short period that
was allowed for campaigns.(45)
All these factors combine to dilute the favourable rating of the province’s democ-
ratic experiences emanating from people’s electoral participation and their enjoy-
ment of individual liberties; and make it difficult to make an overall rating of the
phenomenon of democracy in this part of the country. This being the case, I am
inclined to go along with part of the conclusion arrived at by researchers who stud-
ied the Kenyan elections of 1992 when they said:
‘... is problematic to categorise societies or political systems as either democratic or




... societies may be more or less democratic at given points in time. Subsequently they
may move progressively in either direction (Bard-Anders, 1993: 37).’
I tend to go along with this kind of conclusion with regards to the rating of the
province’s level of democracy during the 1996 election period. This to me was nei-
ther particularly high nor low. This is not because I have to put it between two
extremes as suggested by the Kenyan Report, but because of the many good and
many bad factors associated with its practice.
Having said this, may I end by requesting Government to examine the major
weaknesses portrayed in the system and take measures that will ensure continued
stability in the nation and lay for posterity a democratic foundation which will stand
the test of time. This may be done through the use of ‘compromise’, since democ-
racy is, as James Hadfield points out, based on compromise. The request is made on
my conviction that governments are the bodies that are best suited to bring about
compromises on matters that divide their individual nations and peoples. They do
this by being flexible on matters that divide them as governments on the one hand
and their opponents on the other; instead of being adamant owing to their (the gov-
ernments’) possession of the instruments of force (the police and armed forces). It is
important that our government revisit contentious issues like the abrogated
‘Barotseland Agreement’, the 1995 Land Act, the 1996 Constitution and the Nikuv
Register to see if any compromises can be reached over them. This, I believe, would
put an end to the controversies that these issues continue to generate and usher our
nation fully united into the 21st century.
N.B. The reported antagonism between the Lozi Royal Establishment and MDD Government
in the early election campaign period came to a complete end after the elections. It was
replaced by an aura of unshakeable good will between the two groups, although the unpopu-
larity of the government among the commonality appears to have taken an upward trend. The
late Litunga enjoyed unprecedented care from the government from the time the rapproche-
ment took place until his demise in July 2000, while the ruling party suffered defeats in three
by election in the province as a manifestation of the continued disaffection of the ordinary
people towards the ruling party.
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NOTES
(1) The name Lozi has generally been used to refer to all indigenous peoples of the Western
Province (Malozi). It has also been used restrictively, however, as is sometimes the case,
to refer to the descendants of the Luyi or Aluyi people who arrived in the province at the
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end of the 17th century and founded what came to be known as the Luyi (Lozi)
Kingdom – including their offshoots namely the Kwangwa, Kwandi, Mbowe, Makoma,
Mwenyi, Nyengo, Imilangu, etc. The restricted usage was made to distinguish these peo-
ple from other Lozi groupings such as the Mbunda or Nkoya, where this was necessary
and an asteric was put against the name to indicate this.
(2) These two former names will be used in some places where needed, particularly where
the pre-colonial period is discussed.
(3) The power struggles were facilitated by the change from female rule to male rule at
Lwambi when Notulu abdicated her throne out of anger. This was because some of the
male rulers at Lwambi coveted the senior throne and tried to capture it upon the death of
its occupant.
(4) Lilalo (sing. Silalo) were administrative divisions in the Lozi political system each of
which comprised a group of villages.
(5) This protection was only limited by the convention that allowed the king to confiscate
land which the owner could not utilize and give it to others who needed it.
(6) Performance of this institution in this manner, constituted a historical record of a
man’s/woman’s possession of the land concerned; which could be cited by that person or
his/her descendants in its defence should some people make claims to the same piece of
land at whatever time thereafter.
(7) Contrary to some scholars who have mistakenly traced the commencement of canal
making in Bulozi to the time of Mulambwa, it has been ascertained that the first such
venture was carried out by the Paris Evangelical Society missionaries at the end of the
19th century, when King Lewanika was on the throne. (Njekwa Kamayoyo, 1984).
(8) The duration period of such labour was fixed at 12 days in a year during 1906.
(9) This invasion took place in the 1840s and resulted in the conquest of the Lozi and the
establishment of Kololo rule which lasted until 1864.
(10) The longest periods of warfare experienced in the Kingdom previously were those
fought by Ngalama against the Kwangwa and Kwandi breakaway groups and those of
Ngombala which destroyed the Kabinga chieftaincy in Makoma and the
Sitwamemba/Kambunji one in Nyengo. These were targeted, however, and did not affect
the whole kingdom.
(11) An example of this is when the British gave away the Caprivi Strip (which was
Loziland) to Germany, in a deal which they (the British) made with the latter on 1/7/90.
(12) Taxes were unwarranted because, much as though great amounts of money were
obtained from Lozi tax payers, very little of it was used for the welfare of those who
paid it.
(13) These powers are reflected in the Barotseland Agreement Document, where they were
sought to be preversed. (Appendix 2)
(14) These designations were introduced at the founding of the Federation of the Rhodesias
and Nyasaland as a way of re-affirming the province’s special position by the colonizing
power.
(15) These elections were the Legislative Council Elections of 1962, the Barotse National
Council Elections of 1963 and the Self-Governing Elections of January, 1964.
(16) This party was initially led by the late Mufaya Mumbuna although most people wrongly
regard it as having been founded by the late Mundia.
(17) The only Lozi who managed to win a post was Mr. Sikota Wina who had contested the
position of Publicity Secretary.
(18) The overall result of these factors in the province was the humiliating defeat of UNIP in
the 1968 General Elections and electorate’s 60% rejection of the government’s referen-
dum proposition put before them during the same election.
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(19) The nationalists’ arch enemy, Sir Roy Welensky is reported to have given the Royal
Establishment backed BNP three Land Rovers and £200 cash for campaign purposes,
and to have sent a public relations officer named George Addicott to help the party dur-
ing the last month of the campaign. (See – Central African Mail, 23rd October 1962)
(20) Reasons for UNIP’s success include its support by Lozi intellectuals, the protectorate’s
backwardness due to its negligence by the colonial administrators and UNIP’s promises
of development for the area. For details, see Sumbwa, G.N., ‘UNIP and the politiciza-
tion of the Rural Masses: The Example of Kalabo District: (Unpublished), pp. 19-29.
(21) The only feature of Local Government administration which appears to have been con-
tradictorily dealt with in the document is that pertaining to land administration.
(Appendix 2).
(22) King Lewanika is said to have executed a lot of people prior to his overthrow and ban-
ishment, and to have become completely changed into a good ruler after his restoration.
(23) While people acknowledged the prevalence of consumer goods since 1991 many regret
the fact that these are normally found at District Headquarters and not in the remote
areas of those districts. Some people in such areas, therefore, still complain of the prob-
lems of access to consumer goods especially those in places where they used to have
NIEC stores but now have to walk 2 to 3 days to the District centres to buy salt and
other necessities.
(24) All the three were MMD founder members: Dr. Inonge Lewanika, her brother, Mr.
Akashambatwa Mbikusita Lewanika and the late Mr. Arthur Wina.
(25) The groups included almost all opposition parties, major church organisations, the Law
Association of Zambia, The Royal Foundation, the student bodies at the two universi-
ties, etc.
(26) Post. 17/11/96. It is surprising to note that the chiefs were making reference to tribal
kingdoms when these no longer exist. What they seem to have expressed is the need for
the Constitution to grant them greater political roles than they currently have.
(27) Informants on this issue showed displeasure about it saying that it was not consistent
with democracy; with some of them deploring the fact that other government workers
who are ruling party members are not subjected to similar threats even if they are politi-
cally active.
(28) The matter was first blamed on one of the MPs in the district in the 1980s and later
on – upon the MMD government.
(29) The Speaker was probably making reference to the Litunga’s acceptance of the position
of Central Committee Member during the Second Republic which many Lozis were not
happy about.
(30) People reportedly came from all the districts of the province and that they guarded the
litunga’s capital for about 10 days.
(31) Testifying to this fact, one induna pointed out that appointments to traditional offices
involved all members ‘even some of those in distant places’.
(32) Also known as ‘Nakatindi Road’ this road is the second tar road in the Western Province
after the Lusaka-Mongu one. Its state is said to be probably the worst of all the tarred
district roads in the country.
(33) The Deputy Minister of Works’ recent ultimatum to the road contractor to work on the
Lusaka-Kaoma road to complete the worst parts of this road in a specified time is testi-
mony to its poor state.
(34) While the clause in the Constitution bars people of foreign parentage from standing for
the presidency, most people in the province regarded it as having been directed to Dr.
Kaunda.
(35) Their structure went down to sections within villages/townships, which meant that party
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messages could reach almost everyone in the community.
(36) An example of this is that of parliamentary aspirants who are said to have used their
vehicles to go and campaign for Local Government aspirants in wards that were outside
the constituencies where they themselves intended to stand.
(37) This was one of the major complaints of MMD party officials who said that the practice
made their work extremely difficult.
(38) Election returns obtained from some FODEP officials.
(39) I was informed of this resolution by one of the party officials in the district. The resolu-
tion, she said, was made because of the candidates’ good performance during his previ-
ous term of office as MP (from 1988-91) which made people greatly desirous of having
him back as their representative.
(40) References were made to MMD campaign teams known as ‘foot soldiers.’ These walked
from village to village for propaganda purposes and were given fairly large sums of
money (K70,000 for five in one instance) as well as ‘litenge’ and ‘T-Shirts’ for distribu-
tion to people attending their meetings.
(41) Besides the said K5 million ‘donation’, other notable things mentioned as having been
given to people as bribery by the MMD in Sinanga District include: a grinding meal
(which was given to the Nalolo Royal Establishment a week before elections), balls and
jerseys to the secondary school and a K20 million grant to the same institution.
(42) The informant said he had the cards in his possession and that he was ready to produce
them as evidence in court if the election result in the constituency were to be challenged.
He also explained that the alleged ‘double voter’ revealed what he did after failing to get
his promised reward for it.
(43) Mr. Kwalombota Mulonda is one example of someone who had stood for and won a seat
in an election before. But this was in 1959 when he stood for a Legislative Council seat
and thoroughly beat his only opponent (the late Mr. Mufaya Mumbuna) who stood on
United Federal Party (UFP) ticket.
(44) Externalization of this dispute was in form of letters to the Security Council, the
Commonwealth and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) requesting these bodies to
intervene in it; in order to prevent it from developing into violence.
(45) The period between the dissolution of Parliament and the date of elections was about a
month.
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APPENDIX 1.
Some privatized companies in western province.
NAME OF LABOUR FORCED VOLUNTARY EMPLOYEES
COMPANY FORCE REDUNDANCIES REDUNDANCIES RETAINED
1. INDECO Milling 53 53 0 0
(Mongu Mill)
2. Lyambi Hotel 33 3 4 26
3. Mongu Dairy Farm 17 17 0 0
4. ZNWMC 6 6 0 0
(Data for Mongu only)
5. Z/Cold Storage 38 38 0 0
(Mongu)
TOTAL 147 117 4 26
Source: Zambia Privatization Agency (RPA) Records.
APPENDIX 2.
THE BAROTSELAND AGREEMENT 1964
Following talks in London between the British Government, the Government of Northern
Rhodesia and The Litunga of Barotseland, an Agreement regarding the position of
Barotseland within independent Northern Rhodesia was concluded at the Commonwealth
Relations Office on 18th May, 1964. It is entitled “The Barotseland Agreement 1964”. It was
signed by Dr. K.D. Kaunda, Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia, by Sir Mwanawina
Lewanika III, K.B.E., Litunga of Barotseland and by the Right Honourable Duncan Sandys,
M.P., Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and for the Colonies, signifying the
approval of Her Majesty’s Government.
The Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia undertook, on behalf of his Government, that
the Agreement would be reaffirmed by the Government of Northern Rhodesia at indepen-
dence.
The text of the Agreement is attached as the Appendix to this Paper on 19th May, 1964.
This Agreement is made this eighteenth day of May 1964 between KENNETH DAVID
KAUNDA, Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia, on behalf of the Government of Northern
Rhodesia of the one part and SIR MWANAWINA
LEWANIKA THE THIRD, K.B.E., Litunga of Barotseland, acting on behalf of himself,
his heirs and successors, his Council, and the chiefs and people of Barotseland of the other
part and is signed by the Right Honourable DUNCAN SANDYS, M.P., Her Majesty’s
Principal Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies, to signify the
approval of Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom of the arrangements entered
into between the parties to this Agreement and recorded therein:
Whereas it is proposed that Northern Rhodesia shall become an independent sovereign
republic to be known as the Republic of Zambia;
And whereas it is the wish of the Government of Northern Rhodesia and of the Litunga of
Barotseland, his Council and the chiefs and people of Barotseland that Northern Rhodesia
should proceed to independence as one country and that all its peoples should be one nation:
And whereas, having regard to the fact that all treaties and other agreements subsisting
between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Litunga of Barotseland will terminate when Northern Rhodesia becomes an
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independent sovereign republic and Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom will
thereupon cease to have any responsibility for the government of Northern Rhodesia, includ-
ing Barotseland, it is the wish of the Government of Northern Rhodesia and of the Litunga of
Barotseland to enter into arrangements concerning the position of Barotseland as part of the
Republic of Zambia to take the place of the treaties and other agreements hitherto subsisting
between Her Majesty the Queen and the Litunga of Barotseland.
And whereas on the sixteenth day of April 1964 a provisional agreement was concluded at
Lusaka with this purpose and it is the desire of the Government of Northern Rhodesia and the
Litunga, acting after consultation with his Council, to conclude a permanent agreement with
this purpose.
Now This Agreement Winesseth and it is hereby agreed between the said Kenneth David
Kaunda, Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia, on behalf of the government of Northern
Rhodesia and the Said Sir Mwanawina Lewanika the Third, K.B.E., Litunga of Barotseland
on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors, his Council and the chiefs and people of
Barotseland as follows:–
1. Citation and Commencement
This Agreement may be cited as the Barotseland Agreement 1964 and shall come into
force on the day on which Northern Rhodesia, including Barotseland, becomes the indepen-
dent sovereign Republic of Zambia.
2. The Constitution of the Republic of Zambia
Shall include the provisions agreed upon for inclusion therein at the Constitutional
Conference held in London in May 1964 relating to:–
(1) the protection of human rights and fundamental freedom of the individual;
(2) the judiciary; and
(3) the public service, and those provisions shall have full force and effect in Barotseland.
3. Administration of Justice
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the people of Barotseland shall be
accorded the same rights of access to the High Court of the Republic of Zambia as are
accorded to other citizens of the Republic under the laws for the time being in force in
the Republic and a judge or judges of the High Court selected from among the judges
who normally sit in Lusaka shall regularly proceed on circuit in Barotseland at such
intervals as the due administration of justice may require.
(2) The people of Barotseland shall be accorded the same rights of appeal from decisions
of the courts of the Republic of Zambia as are accorded to other citizens of the
Republic under the laws for the time being in force in the Republic.
4. The Litunga and His Council
(1) The Government of the Republic of Zambia will accord recognition as such to the per-
son who is for the time being the Litunga of Barotseland under the customary law of
Barotseland.
(2) The Litunga of Barotseland, acting after consultation with his Council as constituted
for the time being under the customary law of Barotseland, shall be the principal local
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authority for the government and administration of Barotseland.
(3) The Litunga of Barotseland, acting after consultation with his Council, shall be autho-
rised and empowered to make laws for Barotseland in relation to the following matters,
that is to say:–
(a) the Litungaship.
(b) the authority at present known as the Barotse Native Government (which shall
hereafter be known as the Barotse Government);
(c) the authorities at present known as Barotse Native Authorities;
(d) the courts at present known as Barotse Native Courts;
(e) the status of members of the Litungs’s Council;
(f) matters relating to local government;
(g) land;
(h) forests,
(i) traditional and customary matters relating to Barotseland alone;
(j) fishing;
(k) control of hunting;
(1) game preservation;
(m)control of bush fires;
(n) the institution at present known as the Barotse Native Treasury;
(o) the supply of beer,
(p) reservation of trees for canoes;
(q) local taxation and matters relating thereto; and
(r) Barotse local festivals.
5. Land
(1) In relation to land in Barotseland the arrangements at out in the annex hereto shall
have effect.
(2) In particular, the Litunga of Barotseland and his council shall continue to have  the
powers hitherto enjoyed by them in respect of land matters under customary law and
practice.
(3) The courts at present known as the Barotse Native Courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion (to the exclusion of any other court in the Republic of Zambia) in respect of mat-
ters concerning rights over interests in land in Barotseland to the extent that those
matters are govermed by the customary law of Barotseland.
Provided that nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as limiting the jurisdiction
and powers of the  High Court of the Republic of Zambia in relation to writs for orders
of the kind at present known as prerogative writs of orders.
(4) Save with the leave of the court at present known as the Saa-Sikalo Kuta, no appeal
shall lie from any decision of the courts at present known as the Barotse Native Courts
given in Exercise of the jurisdiction referred to in paragraph (3) of this article to the
High Court of the Republic of Zambia.
(5) Civil servants
All public officers of the Government of the Republic of Zambia who may from time
to time be stationed in Barotseland shall be officers serving on permanent and pension-
able terms.
(6) Financial responsibility
The Government of the Republic of Zambia shall have the same general responsibil-
ity for providing financial support for the administration and economic development of
Barotseland as it has for other parts of the Republic and shall ensure that, in discharge
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of this responsibility, Barotseland is treated fairly and equitably in relation to other
parts of the Republic.
(7) Implementation
The Government of the Republic of Zambia shall take such steps as may be neces-
sary to ensure that the laws for the time being in force in the Republic are not inconsis-
tent with the provisions of this Agreement.
(8) Interpretation
Any question concerning the interpretation of this Agreement may be referred by the
government of the Republic of Zambia to the High Court of the Republic for consider-
ation (in which case the opinion thereon of the Courts shall be communicated to that
Government and to the Litunga of Barotseland and his Council) and any such question
shall be so referred if the Litunga, acting after consultation with his Council, so
requests.
(9) Revocation
The therein before-recited Agreement of the sixteenth day of April 1964 is hereby
revoked.
ANNEX TO THIS AGREEMENT
1. The Litunga and National Council of Barotseland have always worked in close co-
operation with the Central Government over land matters in the past, have agreed that
the Central Government should use land required for public purpose, have adopted the
same procedures as apply to leases and rights of occupancy in the Reserves and Trust
land areas, where applicable. At the same time, the administration of land rights in
Barotseland under customary law and practice has been under the control of the
Litunga and National Council in much the same way as customary land rights are dealt
with in the Reserves and Trust Land areas.
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In witness where of
the parties hereto have of
hereunto act their hands
in the presence of–
(Signed)
E.D. HONE
Governor of Northern Rhodesia
(Signed)
K.D. KAUNDA




of State for Commonwealth
Relations and the Colonies
(Signed)
MWANAWINA LEWANIKA III,




Signed by the Right Honourable Duncan








2. In these circumstances it is agreed that the Litunga should continue to have the greatest
measure of responsibility for administering land matters in Barotseland. It is however
necessary to examine the position of land in Barotseland against the background of
responsibility for the territory.
3. The Barotse memorandum has indicated that Barotseland should become an integral
part of Northern Rhodesia. In these circumstances the Northern Rhodesia Government
will assume certain responsibilities and to carry these out they will have to have certain
powers. So far as land is concerned, apart from confirmation of wide powers to the
Litunga over customary matters, the position is as follows:–
(1) The Northern Rhodesia Government does not wish to derogate from any of the
powers exercised by the Litunga and Council in respect of land matters under cus-
tomary law and practice.
(2) The Northern Rhodesia Government would like to ensure that the provision of
public services and the possibility of economic development in Barotseland are not
hampered by special formalities.
(3) The Northern Rhodesia Government recognises and agrees that full consultation
should take place with the Litunga and Council before any land in Barotseland is
used for public purposes or in the general interests of economic development.
4. The position regarding land in Barotseland in an independent Northern Rhodesia
should, therefore, be as follows:
(1) There should be the same system for land administration for the whole of Northern
Rhodesia including Barotseland, that is, the Government Lands Department should
be responsible for professional advice and services with regard to land alienation in
all parts of Northern Rhodesia and that the same form of document should be used
for grants of land
(i) for Government purposes
(ii) for non-Government and non-customary purposes. The necessary preparation
of the title documents should be done by the Government Lands Department.
(2) The Litunga and National Council of Barotseland will be charged with the respon-
sibility for administering Barotse customary land law within Barotseland.
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